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Some empirical investigations are pointing to the fact that high-tech
rms are subject to credit rationing to a higher extent than the average. This
excess of credit rationing may not be due to information asymmetries, but
rather to the inability of credit institutions to screen projects in novel elds.
This article provides a model of this phenomenon and explores its impli-
cations in the light of recent changes in the screening procedures of major
banks. In particular, the changes to be made in order to comply with the
Basel II accord emphasize the impact of screening procedures on credit
rationing.
Keywords: CreditRationing,High-TechFirms, InternalRatingSystems, Basel
II.
1 Introduction
It is well known that credit is not conceded to those applicants who offer the
highest interest rate. Rather, it is conceded to those who offer the most reliable
prospects that the debt will be repaied. Essentially, credit is rationed because by
increasing the interest rate banks would screen for riskier, less protable projects
[30] [31] [43] [8]. Thus, economic theory sees credit rationing as an instance of
asymmetric information.
1Interestingly, practitioners tend to stress another aspect. Giving for granted
that loan applicants typically hide some information, they are rather concerned
with the content of the information that they provide. Specically, they are con-
cerned about the soundness of the projects that they should nance and the ability
of their proponents to carry them out. In the limit, one may mention a popular
guide for venture capitalists listing such things as a deprived childhood, an absent
father, a strong mother and a sense of guilt for having not lived up to parents'
expectations as the hallmarks of successful entrepreneurs [40].
Be these features relevant or not, the crucial issue is that practitioners want to
know whether potential borrowers know what they are doing. After discounting
for the fact that loan applicants portray a rosy picture of their enterprise, they want
to focus on the details of the projects they are asked to nance.
These details may be quite easy to specify if the project is presented by a well-
acquainted rm that is expanding on a stable technology. On the contrary, it may
be a very difcult task when money is demanded for an enterprise of a novel kind,
one that has never been undertaken before.
Investments often involve novel technologies, and possibly the creation of
novel institutions and consumption habits [33]. Being novel, no objective prob-
ability distribution of their success can be measured. Thus, even if information
asymmetries would not exist, banks ofcials would still have a hard time trying
to understand whether a potential borrower is a visionary business man or a mad
man.
Figure 1 illustrates my point with respect to the received theory. Information
asymmetriesmakefor acloudbetweenloanapplicantsandthebank. Thepresence
of this cloud is a sufcient reason for screening applicants and rationing credit
rather than increasing the interest rate until demand equals supply.
However, I am claiming that if technological or institutionalinnovations make
for uncertainty, the very information available to loan applicants is cloudy as well.
Even a bank disposing of the same information as the loan applicant may never-
thelessfeel unableto classifytheproposed projectina class of risk. Consequently,
it may decide not to make any offer, for no value of the interest rate. Thus, pre-
cisely the most innovative rms may experience credit rationing to a larger extent
than the average.
Indeed, credit rationing has been found to be strongest when innovative tech-
nologies are involved [28] [3]. In principle, it is the stock market with its variety
of investors that should be able to nance the most innovative enterprises [1].
In practice, stock markets are oriented by rating agencies and their classication





Figure 1: Information asymmetries make it difcult to establish one-to-one rela-
tionships between classes of risk and interest rates. Moreover, uncertainty makes
it difcult to dene classes of risk.
features in order to be positively valued [47]. The problem is that both banks
and nancial markets need some form of classication of investment projects, and
since classication rests on past experience, innovativeprojects that do not t con-
ventional wisdom have a hard time. Simply, bank ofcials do not lend money for
projects that they do not understand, and rating agencies do not do better.
Several economists have pointed to this additional reason for credit rationing
[16] [17] [38] [46] [7], though this issue has remained quite marginal hitherto.
However, it may become very relevant since the Bank of International Settlements
is purporting a link between liquidity requirements and the riskiness of loans, and
this link should be based on internal rating systems [5]. In fact, the initiative of
the Bank of International Settlements is prompting banks to improve their rating
systems and to compete for the best classication procedures.
This article is a rst attempt to model these processes and their possible dy-
namics. Section 2 reports on qualitative and quantitative empirical evidence on
internal ratings. Section 3 presents a model of credit rationing that combines
information asymmetries with lack of condence in the rating system when inno-
vations appear. Section 4 explores the processes by which internal rating systems
may be adapted to a changing reality. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
The process of classifying loan applications into risk categories is the very core
of banking. Traditionally, it has been hidden by strict secrecy. However, since
a few years the Bank of International Settlements is searching ways for adapting
liquidity requirements to the riskiness of loan portfolios. Consequently, a certain
amount of empirical research has been carried out and some results have been
3published.
According to these investigations, banks make use of categories for projects
which they decide to nance (the so-called pass-grades) as well as for projects
which they decide not to nance (the so-called fail-grades). Categories for
projects that are not nanced are rare and few in number. Categories for projects
that are nanced are many more.
In this study, only categories for projects that are nanced will be considered.
Severalfeatures ofthesecategoriesare importantinorder tounderstandtheimpact
of innovation on credit rationing.
First, one may ask how far in the past the judgment is stretched. It is obvious
that classication is made depending on past performance, but in order to run a
model we may need to know whether it is a matter of months or decades.
A study by the Bank of International Settlements [4] collected the answer
three years or more, but only from a fraction of the thirty banks that were in-
terviewed. In a public declaration, an ofcial of a large Italian bank spoke of
three years [26]. Indeed, a guide for practitioners recommends to focus on the
previous few years [14].
Secondly, one may want to know the number of risk categories employed by
banks. Several studies have shed light on this issue.
In 1995, English and Nelson collected data from 114 U.S. banks. They found
that 85% of them had a rating system and that the average number of risk cate-
gories ranged from 3.4 for smaller banks to 4.8 for larger banks [10] [21]. In 1997,
Treacy and Carey carried out a reasearch among the 50 largest U.S. banks, nding
a number of risk categories ranging from 2 to the low 20s and an average of 3-4
[44]. In 1998 Weber, Krahnen and Voßman interviewed the four largest German
banks found outnumbers of risk categories ranging from 5 to 8 [45]. Similarly,De
Laurentis found out that the ve largest Italian banks in the years 1996-98 were
using 6-7 classes of risk [34]. In 1999, the Bank of International Settlements on
a sample of over thirty banks, generally large and interanationally diversied [4].
Finally, by interviewing three specialized German banks in 2001 Norden found
that the number of risk categories was 6, 9 and 14, respectively [37].
Figure 2 reports the distribution of the number of risk categories found by the
Bank of International Settlements. The number of risk categories ranges between
2 and 20. This, this range includes the numbers found by other studies.
In their empirical study of 1997, Treacy and Carey revisited older investiga-
tions as well. They came to the conclusion that a decade earlier the number of
risk categories might have been smaller, in the order of three if they were in place
at all [44]. They remarked that the number of risk categories increased both with
4Figure 2: The distribution of the number of risk categories among thirty large
international banks. By courtesy of the Bank of International Settlements [4]
time and with the size of banks, but not indenetly. According to their suggested
interpretation, this is due to a trade-off between the advantages of a large number
of categories for running automatized systems for detecting problem loans on the
one hand, and the difculties posed by large number of categories to boundedly
rational decision-makers on the other hand.
Notably, banks that are using a very large number of categories generally de-
rived them by adding a + or - to a smaller set of categories. For instance, a
system with 6 categories can be easily turned into a system of 12 categories by
requiring bank ofcials to qualify their judgment specifying whether the loan is
in the upper end of the category (with a +) or in the lower one (with a -). By
doing so, human operators can approach the classication problem in two steps
[44].
Finally, it is very important to know the criteria by which loan applications are
classied. In particular, this is important in order to formulate guidelines along
which the classication criteria may be changed with time.
According to several empirical studies, it appears that both hard and soft
aspects are considered by banks, though this distinction is blurred by the fact that
even soft aspects are translated into numerical values [11] [4] [27]. A possible
list of the aspects involved may be the following:
1. Loan specication in terms of collaterals and terms of payment [9] [34] [4].
5In particular, securities are a condition for evaluating other aspects [14].
2. Financial indicators [45] [34] [4], eventually used by automatized proce-
dures such as the Z-score [2] or neural networks [32].
3. The technology employed by the project, to be evaluated with respect to
the industries on which it is expected to impact [35] [45]. In particular,
marginal rms in mature sectors are often sources of nancial distress [14].
4. Psychological features of the applying entrepreneur and quality of the man-
agement team, to be considered in conjunction with the structure of the
industry where the applicant operates [6] [39] [35] [45] [4]. Management
quality may be inferred by the absence of litigations, suppliers satisfaction
and managers succession plans [14].
5. Reliability of the information provided by the applicant. It is increased by
a lasting acquaintance [20] [34] but may eventually be disrupted by sig-
nals of increasing information asymmetries such as changes of accounting
procedures or a growing reluctance to provide information [15].
6. Information provided by the stock market and its rating agencies, or by
customers and suppliers of the applicant [9] [34] [4]. For rms with over
25%of operationsabroad, the countryriskevaluatedbyratingagencies may
be included [14].
It has been observed that several banks are shifting from rating systems based
ononesinglesetof categoriestoratingsystemsbasedonseveralsetsofcategories,
each for a different aspect of a loan application. The most common distinction is
between aspects that pertain to the applicant (issues 2, 4 and 5 above) and aspects
that pertain to the particular project for which a loan is requested (issues 1, 3 and 6
above)[44] [4] [34]. However,itappears thatsomebanksare movingevenfurther,
evaluating several or all of the above aspects separately or, in some cases, even
subdividing them further according to their components [45]. By having different
bank ofcials specialized in one or a few aspects of rating, a bank is better able
to detect warning signs that involve only one aspect. Subsequently, a thorough
examination of all the aspects of a loan may be started [34].
This suggests that the number of aspects that are considered separately has a
huge impacton lending decisions. The more aspects are considered separately, the
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Figure 3: The return on lending as a function of the interest rate. If projectsbelong
to n classes of risk, this function is not monotonic.
impair the evaluation of innovative projects that cut across the borders of existing
categories.
More on this in § 4. In the ensuing § 3, credit rationing is examined with
reference to one single set of risk categories. In this simpler setting, which is still
a realistic description of the functioning of many banks, each category refers to a
different class of risk but each category encompasses all of the above aspects.
3 Credit Rationing
Stiglitz and Weiss [43] pointed out that by increasing the interest rate the least
risky loans drop out a bank's portfolio. Thus, it is not convenient for banks to
select loan applications by means of the interest rate. Rather, they should segment
the market classifying loan applications in a discrete number of classes of risk. To
each class of risk, a different interest rate applies. Figure 3, freely adapted from
[43], explains this concept.
For interest rates r






￿ the bank makes higher prots. However, for r
￿ r1 the least
risky projects are no longer proposed. Thus, at r
￿ r1 the expected return to the
bank drops. It increases again with r for r1
￿ r
￿ r2, to drop again at r
￿ r2
and so on up to rn. Thus, it is convenient for the bank to segment the market by
classifying loan applicants into n classes of risk applying a different interest rate
each.









Figure 4: When risk categories work properly, to each risk category corresponds
a different interest rate.
rate that would obtain by equating demand and supply. In fact, if the bank fears
that the market equilibrium interest rate would only attract swindlers, it may not
concede any loan at that rate. Thus in general it is rn
￿ r
￿ , where r
￿ is the interest













￿ n it is ri
￿ r
￿ . Thus, at least to the applicants
borrowing at ri
￿ rn credit is rationed.








￿ Rn ordered by increasing risk. To each risk category corresponds

















￿ rn. Thus, a decision
about the interest rates is made at the same time a loan applicant is classied in a
risk category.
Figure 4 illustrates these one-to-one correspondences between classes of risk
and interest rates. The arrows indicate that being classied in a particular class of
risk implies that the loan applicant is offered the corresponding interest rate.
My point is that, if technological innovations change the features of projects
in ways that are not well understood by a bank, classication in a class of risk
may be impossible. Thus, a bank may suspend credit until the risks and prospects
of novel projects have become clear.
Innovations may be such that investment projects nanced with great con-
dence end up with failures. For instance, investments by the industry of photo-
graphic lms may be ruined by digital cameras, or investments in oil extraction
may be ruined by wars and revolutions. Such occurrences call for renements of
the classicationcriteria. For instance, one may wantnarrow the scope of low-risk










Figure 5: If innovations are such that some projects obtain very different returns
from those expected, then the causal relationships from classes of risk to interest
rates become one-to-many.
Likewise, projects of novel kinds may become very protable so the category
of low-risk projects should be redesigned. For instance, the category of low-risk
projects may be adjusted to include investments in the production of digital cam-
eras.
If innovations decrease the protability of projects that used to be safe, than
the bank observes a causal link from a class of (previously) low risk to a high
interest rate. Conversely, to the extent that innovations opened up new elds the
bank observes a causal link from a class of (previously) high risk to a low interest
rate. In both cases, the one-to-one connections of gure 4 becomes the one-to-
many connections of gure 5.
In other words, the bank expected a certain probability of default but observes
another one. For instance, it may observe that defaults on investments related to
photographic lms are occurring more often than expected.
The cross-connections of gure 5 warn that projects have been classied in
the wrong risk categories. Provided that the cababilities of bank ofcials did not
change with time, this is a signal that the features of the projects did. Thus, the
criteria by which projects are classied should be changed as well.
The classication criteria should be adapted to the innovations that have taken
place by including technological and institutional details that had been ignored
hitherto. For instance, the class of low-risk projects may now include those based
on digital cameras whereas projects based on photosensitive lm technology may
be downgraded to very risky, though the producers of X-ray photosensitive lms
may need to be included in still another risk category.
Eventually, the revised classication criteria achieve the goal of turning back
9the connections between the Ris and the ris into a one-to-one mapping as in g-
ure 4. Subsequently, other innovations may turn it again into a one-to-many map-
ping as in gure 5, and so on with every innovation.
During the time periods when there are one-to-many connections between
classes of risk and interest rates, a bank is unable to assign a project to a class
of risk. Therefore, it may not concede credit altogether.
Since in our case thisdecision depends on detectingnovelties, it mustbe based
on a restricted number of very recent observations. Let m
￿ N denote the number
of past time intervals upon which bank ofcers evaluate the appropriateness of
their causal map. For brevity, m will be called the memory of bank ofcers. It is
obviously m
￿ 0, with m
￿ 0 in the special case when bank ofcers look only at
present-day occurrencies.
Let us dene the complexity of the decision-making problem as a measure of
the extent to which the connections that occurred in the last m time intervals are
intertwined [24]. The following account is an excerpt of more technical publica-
tions [13], [22], [23].
The structure of connections between classes of risk and interest rates can
be usefully subsumed by means of a simplicial complex. This is composed by
connected simplices, each for each class of risk. The vertices of each simplex are
the interest rates to which a particular class of risk is connected.
If the connections between classes of risk and interest rates are one-to-one as
in gure 4, simplices are isolated points so no simplicial complex exists. In this
case, complexity is zero.
On the contrary, if at least two simplices have at least one vertex in common,
a simplicial complex exists and complexity is greater than zero. For instance, the








￿ Rn. The simplex R1 is a segment whose vertices are r1 and rn. The sim-
plex R2 is a segment whose vertices are r1 and r2. More intertwined connections
may be represented by simplicial complexes composed by many more simplices,
possibly of higher dimension.
Two simplices are connected if they have at least one common vertex. Two
simplicesthathaveno commonvertexmaynonethelessbeconnected bya chain of





























￿ 0, wherelxy isthedimensionofthecommonface
between Rx and Ry. In particular, two contiguous simplices are connected at level
q if they have a common face of dimension q.
Let us consider the common faces between simplices and let us focus on the
10face of largest dimension and let Q denote the dimension of this face. It is Q
￿
n
￿ 1, where Q
￿ n
￿ 1 means that there are at least two overlapping simplices
that include all possible vertices.
Let us partition the set of simplices that compose the simplicial complex ac-
cording to their connection level q. In general, for
￿ q there exist several classes
of simplices such that the simplices belonging to a class are connected at q. Let
us introduce a structure vector s whose q-th component sq denotes the number of









vector s has Q
￿ 1 rows.
In order to avoid repetitions in the calculus of complexity, a class of simplices










as well. For instance, let simplices R1 and R2 be connected at level q
￿ 2, and




￿ is a class of










￿ is not a class of simplices connected at level q
￿ 0.
The following measure for the complexity of a simplicial complex has been
















where the sum extends only to the terms such that sq
￿
￿ 0. Finally, it is stipulated
that the complexity of two or more disconnected simplicial complexes is the sum
of their complexities.
The complexity seen by a bank ofcial who is evaluating the reliability of an
attribution of classes of risk depends on the observed connections between classes
of risk and interest rates, which realise out of an unknown stochastic distribution
F . It alsodepends on m, the memorylength, as well as on n, the number of classes
of risk. While F is unknown by the bank ofcial, m and n are parameters under
her/his control.
Expression 1 takes account of two opposite effects. On the one hand, the
numerator increases with the number of connections between classes of risk and
interestrates. Thus, it simplymeasures the extentto which novelconnections con-
fuse the causal map. On the other hand, the denominator of 1 makes complexity
decrease if cross-connections are separated in distinct groups.
Complexity 1 increases monotonically with both m and n. On the contrary, its
dependence on F is more interesting.
Let us consider the simple case where cross connections occur stochastically
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Figure 6: Complexity as a function of f, with m
￿ 3, n
￿ 10. All values have been
averaged over 1,000,000 steps.









sidering the empirical evidence of § 2, m
￿ 3 and n
￿ 10 appears an appropriate
choice. Figure 6 illustrates the ensuing values of complexity with f increasing
from 0 to 100% of total connections.
Figure 6 makes clear that complexity is adifferent from randomness, disor-
der or any other property of the environment. Rather, it is a subjectiveevaluation.
Up to a fraction of cross-connections of about 35-40%, a bank ofcial may judge
that the more disordered the connections, the more complex the environment.
Beyond this threshold, cross-connections are so many that the bank ofcial may
judge that it is not worth to distinguish among projects whose returns are totally
unpredictable. Consequently, the business environment is less complex for her.
More precisely, complexity approachs to n for very high values of f.
However, things change if cross-connections do not extend very far. Let us












￿ rn if i
￿ n
￿ r).
The previous case obtains if r
￿ n
￿ 1. If r
￿ 0 no cross-connections occur, so
complexityis zero. In all intermediate cases some cross-connections do occur, but
they are localized in a spot of radius r around each Ri.
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Figure 7: Complexity as a function of f, with m
￿ 3, n




















￿ 9, all parameters asin gure 6.
Cross-connections occur with increasing probability, but only within an interval
specied by the parameter r.
Ingure 7we seethatifcross-connectionsare sufcientlylocalized, confusion
between causal attributions of interest rates to classes of risk never grows so large
that a decision-maker may give up the hope to improve classication criteria 
i.e. complexity never decreases. It reaches plateaus, however. These may suggest
bank ofcials to accept as unavoidable a certain level of imperfection of their
classication criteria.
Since complexity measures the unreliability of classication criteria as it is
subjectively evaluated by bank ofcials, it is sensible to assume that they may
decide to revise these criteria whenever C
￿ 0. However, it is conceivable that
some banks start to revise classication criteria when C
￿ d, where d
￿ 0 is a
bank-specic threshold, or when ¶C
￿ ¶t
￿ 0.
While the exact formulation is an open empirical question, the proposed mea-
sure of complexity constitutes a theoretically grounded indicator of the point in
time when classication criteria are revised. So long this revision is on-going,
13loans may not be conceded.
Eventually, the above description may be duplicated across markets or geo-
graphical area. For instance, a bank may carry out separate classications of loan
applications in different industries or regions.
4 Revising the Classication Criteria
If complexity is greater than zero, bank ofcials set out to revise the criteria by








￿ Rn, the process of revising the classication criteria is
largely carried out informally in their minds. Little can be said about it, either
because it is tacit knowledge or because explicit rules are eventually covered by
secrecy.
However, the empirical investigations reported in § 2 revealed that banks are
moving towards an arrangement of the classication process where different as-
pects are considered separately (nancial indicators, management quality etc.).
Allegedly, the reason is that if one single aspect becomes problematic, a thorough
evaluation of all aspects of a loan is carried out.


















So long all Cis are zero (or below a pre-dened threshold), the classication
criteria are not doubted. A loan application may be classied in different classes
of risk for each different aspect, and the overall class of risk may result out of a
weighted average of the classes of risk in each aspect.
On the contrary, if
￿ i such thatCi
￿ 0 the criteria of classication are doubted.
Bank ofcials must make sense of the observed empirical evidence by re-dening
the classication criteria in such a way that all mappings between classes of risk
and interest rates are one-to-one, i.e. all Cis are zero. Essentially, it is a matter
of including issues that have become relevant while excluding other that are no
longer so.
This problem is akin to solving puzzles such as Chess or the Rubik Cube. The
nal state to be reached is known  each face of the cube of one single colour, all
Cis at zero  and a set of possible moves  rotating the faces of the cube, adding
or expunging issues of collaterals, technology, management quality etc.
If humans had the time and the computational resources to explore all possi-
ble combinations, the set of optimal solutions to any puzzle would be known [18]
14[19]. Indeed, puzzles are such because the number of possible states  e.g. the
number of congurations of the tiles of the rubik cube, the number of technologi-
cal features to be combined with management features, terms of contracts etc. 
exceeds human bounded rationality.
Boundedly rational decision-makers may make mistakes when possibilities
are too many. Thus, they may nd it convenient to ignore some information [29],
for instance by compacting it into coarse categories. However, to the extent that
these categories generalise certain moves to states to which they do not apply,
decision-makers may be trapped far away from the solution [18] [19].
Obviously,boundedlyrational decision-makersattempt to decompose difcult
problems into simpler ones [41]. The difculty lies precisely in the fact that many
problems are not decomposable [19]. For instance, by rotating the slices of the
Rubik Cube until one obtains that all tiles on a face have the same colour may not
help to reach the solution. The problem of nding a set of risk categories such
that complexity is zero is plagued by the same sort of difculty. For instance,
the evaluation of the prospects of a technology may not be independent of the
evaluation of management quality.
The collection of empirical testimonies reported in § 2 identied a maximum
of six broad aspects, depending in their turn on ner sub-aspects. For instance,
the aspect nancial indicators may be broken down in a number of accounting
variables, and the same holds for technologies, management features and so on.
No empirical evidence is available concerning the number of these sub-aspects,
though the qualitative descriptions reported in § 2 may suggest numbers in the
order of a few units. A possible exception may be the number of technological
features, which may conceivably be very many.
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￿ 6 and Na
￿ 10, a reasonable interval for N may be 1
￿ N
￿ 60. Even
with a low estimate of N
￿ 10, the number of congurations where for each i it is
either Ci
￿ 0 or Ci





￿ !, which is very likely to exceed the human computa-
tional abilities.
However, the six aspects identied in § 2 are rather independent from one an-
other. On the contrary, the sub-aspects within each aspect depend strongly of one
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Figure 8: A plausible form of the decomposability matrix for the six aspects men-
tioned in § 2. The six aspects have been supposed to entail N1, N2, N3, N4, N5 and
N6 sub-aspects each. Columns are denoted by the same indices as rows.
dent from the evaluation of management quality, whereas the nancial indicators
that enter the Z-score to some extent overlap one another.
The transition matrix is a N
￿ N binary matrix where the element at row i and
column j species whether Ci depends on Cj. By permutation of its rows and
columns one obtains a decomposability matrix where the non-zero elements are
arrange as close as possible to the diagonal. If sub-aspects are strongly dependent
of one another whereas the main aspects are relativelyindependentof one another,
the decomposability matrix is likely to take the form depicted in gure 8.
The diagonal squares entail most interdependencies between sub-aspects, rep-
resented by an x. A few dependencies are outside the diagonal squares because
e.g. the prospects of a technology may not be totally independent from the abil-
ities of managers. On the whole, the problem of dining categories such that
Ci
￿ 0 for
￿ i is nearly-decomposable along the six aspects [42]. On the contrary,
the sub-aspects within each aspect are very much dependent on one another.
To the extent that these six aspects of the loan classication problem are inde-
pendent of one another, it is convenient to decompose the problem into subprob-
lems. On the contrary, an integrated approach is best suited for interdependent
16.
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Figure 9: Another plausibleform of the decomposabilitymatrix for the six aspects
mentioned in § 2, provided that aspects 3 and 4 are compounded in a single one.
The six aspects have been supposed to entail N1, N2, N3, N4, and N5 sub-aspects
each. Columns are denoted by the same indices as rows.
aspects. Thus, in the case of gure 8 it seems sensible to carry out independent
evaluations of the six aspects, whereas all sub-aspects within each aspect should
be considered in a single evaluation. In fact, parallel explorationof highly interde-
pendent sub-aspects may keep the decision-maker on a local optimum (most Cis
are zero, but not all of them) that may be far away from the global solution (all
Cis at zero).
The six aspects of § 2 were extracted out of several independent information
sources regarding various money-lenders. In reality, many banks do not decom-
pose the loan classication problem so nely. For instance, some banks may com-
pound the evaluation of management quality with the evaluation of the prospects
of technologies, as in gure 9.
One may sensibly ask whether such structures of problem-solving are remain-
ders of the past, doomed to extinction. The previous considerations suggest that
there are strong incentives to decompose the loan classication problem as nely
as possible. However, this may not be the case for all banks.
17Simulations show that, because parallel exploration is fast, in an ecology
of decision-makers those who (wrongly) apply parallel search to interdependent
problems are likely to crowd out those who (correctly) search an integrated solu-
tion. this is coherent with the idea that there are strong incentives to decompose,
perhaps even more nely than along the six main aspects [25] [12] [36].
However, the same simulations show that there is exception to this pattern,
namely, when the environment is so variable that an integrated approach is ab-
solutely necessary in order to escape from local optima. Thus, one may expect
that money lenders willing to discover exploit market niches  such as venture
capitalists or local banks  will keep problem decompositionat a minimum. This
makes the loan classication problem very difcult and prone to mistakes, but so-
lutions may be found, that those banks who follow more standardised procedures
will never reach.
5 Conclusion
Credit rationingis one of thoseissues where the neoclassical modelof competitive
markets does not apply. Similarly to other market failures, asymmetric informa-
tion has been suggested as an explanation.
Since asymmetric information is sufcient to justify the existence of credit
rationing, little effort has been devoted to alternative, or additional explanations.
Though a few economists voiced that uncertainty does play a role in credit ra-
tioning, this argument has not been pursued in either empirical or analytical terms.
The empirical evidence on credit rationing to high-tech rms is questioning
this approach, since there is no reason why information asymmetries should be
higher if sophisticated technologies are involved. Furthermore, the new accord
on capital requirements (Basel II) is emphasising the importance of bank internal
ratingsystems, a circumstance that triggeredmanyinterestingempirical investiga-
tions. Both streams of enquiry point to the cognitive difculties posed by difcult
classication problems.
The modelling approach presented in this article is innovative, but admittedly
tentative and incomplete. Nevertheless, the author deems that it is worth to be
presented and discussed in the hope that more information will be disclosed to
researchers. The diffusion of computer-based procedures for evaluating loan ap-
plications is likely to increase both the need and the feasibility of scientic studies
on banks's internal rating systems and the extent to which they inuence credit ra-
tioning.
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